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1 Introduction
In two landmark papers, Goyal and Joshi (2003, 2006) set forth the issue of using the
emerging network formation literature to discuss collaboration in R&D among a set
of oligopolistic firms. The first paper characterizes stable and eﬃcient networks. The
second paper show that the model is an example of a more general category of models
called playing the field games. In this paper, we extend the analysis to oligopolistic
firms competing in more than one market.
Goyal and Joshi (2003) put forward the proposition that firms competing in a
homogeneous Cournot oligopoly with constant returns to scale cost functions and
forming collaborative links among themselves will form a complete network under
negligible link formation costs. The rationale is straightforward. Links lower marginal
costs of both players involved in forming a link. The firm gains in terms of gross profits
(or profits not including link formation costs) by the lowering of its marginal cost.
It loses by the lowering of its partner’s marginal costs. The gain outweighs the loss
and hence link formation is profitable. Similar results will follow if link formation
increases demand (for instance, by increasing the demand intercept) of both firms
forming a collaborative link. Such increases may be the outcome of quality enhancing
collaborations.
Now, consider the case where firms compete in more than one market. Then, the
mechanics of the eﬀects associated with link formation are much more complicated.
Bulow et al. (1985) investigate some of these eﬀects in a general strategic setting.
Suppose there are joint diseconomies across markets in the sense that higher quan-
tity produced in one market reduces marginal profitability associated with an unit
of production in the other. Furthermore, the market structure is such that goods
produced by competing firms are strategic substitutes. Then any strategic action
(such as collaborative link formation) designed to increase demand and reduce costs
inevitably increases the quantity produced in one market. This will (because of joint
diseconomies) reduce the marginal profitability and quantity produced in the other
market. Because of strategic substitutability, rival firms increase quantities produced
and this induces certainly a loss in the second market and possibly an overall loss for
the firm.
We investigate the stable and eﬃcient networks that may form in the setting of
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a multi-market oligopoly with non-negative link formation costs. We assume a het-
erogeneous product market, linear demand curves and quadratic cost functions. In a
departure from Goyal and Joshi (2003), we look at quality-enchancing collaborations
rather than cost-reducing collaborations. Since multiple quality levels are incompati-
ble with the notion of a homogeneous product, we look at a market with diﬀerentiated
products. The quadratic cost functions are introduced in order to make sure that the
assumption of joint diseconomies (defined below) is valid. This play a key role in the
inter-market eﬀects. If we use linear cost functions, the inter-market eﬀects disap-
pear and we expect too see results that are similar to Goyal and Joshi (2003). A link
between two firms with shift the demand curves of both firms to right as a result of
quality improvements. Firms compete in two separate markets but for purposes of
simplicity, quality enhancing collaborations are restricted only to one market. The
cost function is a quadratic function of quantities produced in both markets.
It turns out that stable networks have, what Goyal and Joshi (2003) refer to
as the dominant group architecture. Namely, the firms can be partitioned into two
groups. In the first group, all firms are linked to each other. In the second group,
the firms have no links whatsoever. This is a consequence of increasing returns to
link formation. Namely, the more links a firm has, the greater the benefit of forming
an additional link. With regard to eﬃcient networks, we cannot arrive at a precise
characterization of the networks that will result though we can derive some interesting
properties of such networks and restrict the set of networks that are eﬃcient into a
small class. For four firms or more, eﬃcient networks have only one component and
the geodesic distance between two connected players cannot exceed two. In other
words, dominant group architectures are possible candidates for eﬃcient networks
but we show using examples, that stable and eﬃcient networks need not coincide.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
discusses the notation and terminology. Section 3 discusses the inter-market eﬀects
a la´ Bulow et. al. (1985). Section 4 discusses stable networks. Section 5 discusses
eﬃcient networks. Section 7 concludes. The paper has a lot of tedious algebra most
of which has been relegated to the Appendix.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Multi-market Cournot Model
Suppose there are  firms indexed  = 1 2      (where  > 2) that compete a la´
Cournot in two inter-related markets  and . Demand in  for firm  is given by
 =  −  −
X
 6=
 (1)
Demand in  for firm  is given by
 =  − −
X
 6=
 (2)
The cost function of the firm  is given by
( ) = 1
2
( +)2 (3)
and profit of firm  is given by
 =  ·  +  · − ( ) (4)
We begin by giving a rationale of the demand function employed here. Products
here are near substitutes but vertically diﬀerentiated. Diﬀerential quality levels allow
firms to charge diﬀerent prices creating a sub-market within the larger market. This
demand function was introduced by Bowley (1924)1 and used by Spence (1976) and
Dixit (1979). More recently, such demand functions have been employed for instance
by Chakrabarti and Haller (2007) in the context of targeted advertising.
The assumption of joint diseconomies is equivalent to
2
  0. In this model,
it holds because
2
 = −1. The assumption of strategic substitutes is equivalent
to
2
  0. In this model, it holds because
2
 = −1.
First consider market 1 in isolation by assuming a priori that  = 0 for all . Let
∗  ∗ and ∗ denote equilibrium quantities and profits in the second stage. Then, it
1Usually, a more general formulation,  =  −  − 
X
 6=
 where 0 6  6 1 is employed. The
current formulation simplifies the exposition without changing the results.
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is straight forward to show that
∗ = 38
µ(+ 1) −X
 6=

+ 2
¶2
.
Let us consider now the full fledged model. Upon solving the second stage of the
model, we get
∗ = 13(3 + 4+ 2)
£
(6 + 8+ 22) − (3 + 4+ 2)
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4+ 2)
£−(5 + 2)+ (4 + )¤ ;
∗ = 13(3 + 4+ 2)
£
(6 + 8+ 22) − (3 + 4+ 2)
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4+ 2)
£−(5 + 2) + (4 + )¤ 
where  = P
=1
 and  =
P
=1
. The calculations are in the appendix. The expression
for profit is complicated and given in the appendix.
2.2 Networks
Let the set of players be denoted by  = {1 2     }. A network  is a list of pairs
of players who are linked to each other. For simplicity, we denote the link between
 and  (where  6= ) by , so  ∈  indicates  and  are linked in the network .
The links are undirected in the sense that we do not distinguish between  and .
Let  be the set of all subsets of  of size 2. The network  is referred to as the
complete network. The set  = { ⊂ } denotes the set of all possible networks on
 . A network in which there are no links is called an empty network and is denoted
by 0.
We let  +  denote the network formed by adding the link  to the network
.  −  denotes the network formed by deleting the link  from the network . A
network payoﬀ function  : → R+ assigns an utility to player  by virtue of being
part of a network. Let  = (1 2     ) denote the vector of utility functions.
Then  combined with  defines a network game.2
2Originally, the term network game was used to denote a transferable utility version of the game
by Jackson (2005).
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A firm ’s neighborhood () is given by { ∈ \{}| ∈ } and its cardinality
is given by () = |()|. () is called the degree of player  in network . We
also define () = ∪∈(). () refers to the set of players that have at least one
link. Let () = #() with the convention that if () = ∅, we let () = 1.3
Player  therefore is participating in the links in her link set () = { ∈  |  ∈
()} ⊂ . Let  = () denote the set of all possible links involving player .
Let () = 1
2
P
∈
() be the total number of links in a network .
For any  ⊂ , let  −  denotes the network formed by deleting the link set 
from the network . Similarly, for  ⊂ \,  +  denotes the network formed by
adding the link set  from the network .
A network  is regular if each player has the same number of neighbors. Namely,
for all  6= , () = ().
A path in  connecting  and  is a set of distinct players {1 2     } ⊂ ()
with  > 2 such that 1 = ,  = , and {12 23     −1} ⊂ . We refer to the
number of links on this path, here − 1, as the length of the path.
We say  and  are connected to each other if a path exists between them and
they are disconnected otherwise. The number of links on the shortest path between
two distinct players  and  is called the geodesic distance between  and .
The network 0 ⊂  is a component of  if (0) > 2 and for all  ∈ (0) and
 ∈ (0),  6= , there exists a path in 0 connecting  and  and for any  ∈ (0) and
 ∈ (),  ∈  implies  ∈ 0. In other words, a component is simply a maximally
connected subnetwork of . We denote the set of network components of the network
 by (). The set of players that are not connected in the network  are collected
in the set of (fully) disconnected players in  denoted by
0() =  \() = { ∈  | () = ∅}
Such players are known as singletons. A component 0 ⊂  is complete if for all
distinct   ∈ (0),  ∈ . A component 0 ⊂  is regular if for all distinct
  ∈ (0), () = (). The dominant group architecture  is characterized by
one complete non-singleton component with  > 2 players and −  singletons.
3We emphasize here that if () 6= ∅, we have that () > 2. Namely, in those cases the network
has to consist of at least one link.
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A network is a pairwise equilibrium network with regard to a profile of utility
functions  if
(a) for all  and  ⊂  (), () > ( − ), and
(b) for all  and  ∈ , if ( + )  () then ( + )  ().
An equivalent definition can be given as follows. Consider a non-cooperative game
where each player  has a strategy set  =
n
{} 6=
o
with  ∈ {0 1}.  = 1means
 intends to form a link with , while  = 0 means  does not intend to form such
a link. A link between two players is formed if and only if  =  = 1. A strategy
profile  = {1 2 · · ·  } induces a network  () =
( S
6=∈∈
| =  = 1
)
.
We say that the network  () is induced by the strategy profile . A network  is a
pairwise equilibrium network (or simply and equilibrium network) if
(a) There is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile that induces ;
(b) for all  and  ∈ , if ( + )  () then ( + )  ().
For any network , and  ⊂ \, we denote the marginal benefit of link formation
by
∆( ) = ( + )− ().
Obviously, for a pairwise equilibrium network, ∆( −  ) > 0 for all  ⊂  ()
and if ∆( )  0 then ∆( )  0.
Next, we define eﬃcient networks. Consider a social welfare function  given by
sums of payoﬀs of all the players. Therefore,
 () =
X
=1
()
A network is eﬃcient it is maximizes the social welfare function. More specifically,
0 is eﬃcient if
 (0) > ()
for all  6= 0. For any network , and  ⊂ \, we denote the marginal change in
social welfare as a result of link formation by
∆ ( ) = ( + )− ().
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Obviously, for an eﬃcient network, ∆ ( −  ) > 0 and ∆ ( ) 6 0.
3 Inter-market Eﬀects
We assume that firms can improve quality via collaborative links in market 1. This
enhances demand. Hence, if a firm has formed  links, then
 = 0 +  ·  (5)
It is reasonable to assume that 0  . For reasons that will be clear later, we assume
0 is suﬃciently large compared to , namely,
0 
∙
(− 1)2
2
¸
 (6)
Link formation costs are given by a real number  where  > 0. To keep the model
tractable, assume that no link formation is possible in the second market. Hence,
assume a two stage game where first stage consists of a link formation game and in
the second stage, Cournot competition ensues. Define
() = 0 +  · ()
Then, the relevant network network payoﬀ function is given by
() = ∗ (())−  · ()
where ∗ (()) is derived by expressing optimal profits ∗ in (36) as a function of
 = (). Let us assume for time being that  = 0.
First consider market 1 in isolation by assuming a priori that  = 0 for all . For
an incomplete network , if  forms a link with  6=  (where  ∈ ), its net profits
increase by
∆( ) = 3
4
µ 
(+ 2)2
¶"
(+ 1) ()−
X
 6=
 () + 
2
#

Now, (+1) ()−
X
 6=
 () > (+1)0−(−1) (0 + (− 1)) = 2·0−(−1)2· 
0 from (6). Hence, each link unambiguously increases profitability and a complete
network is the unique pairwise stable network. This leads to the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 Let us exogenously impose the condition that  = 0 for all . Then, with
 = 0, the unique pairwise equilibrium network is given by the complete network.
Let us consider now the full fledged model. If  forms a link with  6= , its net
profits increase by
∆( ) =
∙  () · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
224 + 1103 + 902 − 134+ 8¢
−
∙
ÃX
 6=
 ()
!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
223 + 1022 + 66− 158¢
−
∙  · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
144 + 703 + 182 − 190− 8¢
+
∙
ÃX
 6=

!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
143 + 782 + 42− 166¢
+
∙ 2
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
114 + 443 − 62 − 100+ 83¢  (7)
Clearly, ∆( ) is not necessary positive. For instance, consider for all ,  =
6  = 400 0 = 100  = 005. Consider an empty network for which  = 0. In
such a network, ∆(0 ) = −00894772 making the empty network an equilibrium
network. In a complete network, deleting a link yields a positive payoﬀ of 00890931
and hence the complete network is not an equilibrium network. In other words, the
mechanics driving the results of Goyal and Joshi (2003) fail to hold. In the Appendix,
we derive precise conditions for the empty network to be an equilibrium network when
the costs of link formation are zero.
We give some intuition behind these results. It follows from strategic complemen-
tarity and joint economies analyzed by Bulow et al. (1985). Note that
∗
 =
µ∗
∗
¶µ∗

¶
+
X
 6=
µ∗
∗
¶µ∗

¶
+
µ∗
∗
¶µ∗

¶
+
X
 6=
µ∗
∗
¶µ∗

¶
+
µ∗

¶
. (8)
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Also,
∗ =
Ã
 −
X
=1
∗
!
∗ +
Ã
 −
X
=1
∗
!
∗ − 12(
∗ +∗ )2.
Hence, for  6= ,
∗
∗ = −
∗  0; (9)
∗
 = 
∗  0; (10)
∗
∗ = −
∗  0 (11)
Also, from first order conditions of profit maximization,
∗
∗ = 0; (12)
∗
∗ = 0 (13)
resulting in two terms of (8) dropping out. In Cournot competition, quantity pro-
duced by a firm in equilibrium is decreasing in the demand intercepts of it’s rivals.
Hence, µ∗

¶
 0 (14)
Further, Bulow et al. (1985) show that

µ∗

¶
= 
∙µ 2

¶
·
µ 2

¶¸
.
Given
µ 2

¶
= −1 and
µ 2

¶
= −1 in this multi-market model,4
µ∗

¶
 0 (15)
Using inequalities (15), (14), (9), (10) and (11), we can sign each term to get the
following:
∗
 =
X
 6=
µ∗
∗
¶
| {z }
0
µ∗

¶
| {z }
0
+
X
 6=
µ∗
∗
¶
| {z }
0
µ∗

¶
| {z }
0
+
µ∗

¶
| {z }
0
. (16)
4Note that inequalities (15) and (14) can be verified from (34) and (35).
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So, the aberrant sign is introduced by the presence of
µ∗

¶
being positive. If it were
negative, then any increase in  would only boost profits and a complete network
would result in equilibrium. In fact, the precise expression for
∗
 is given by
∗
 = 
∗
µ
1 +
(5 + 2)(− 1)
3(3 + 4+ 2)
¶
−∗
µ
(4 + )(− 1)
3(3 + 4+ 2)
¶
 (17)
Given that an increase in demand in one market no longer unambiguously increases
profit, the result follows.
4 Configuration of Equilibrium Networks
While the payoﬀ functions are quite complicated, this game has features that were
analyzed by Goyal and Joshi (2006). We will devote some space to reproducing their
definitions and terminology. Let us assume  > 0.
Suppose from the network , we remove player  and all his links, and call the
resulting network −. Namely, − =  − (). Now, the total number of links in
this network − is given by 1
2
P
 6=
 (−) =  (−).
Definition 1 A network game is called playing the field game if the payoﬀ function
of player  is a function of her degree  () and  (−), namely,
 () = Φ ( ()   (−))−  · ()
Definition 2 The payoﬀ function Φ is convex in its own links if the marginal returns
Φ ( + 1 )−Φ ( ) is strictly increasing in .
Definition 3 Suppose 0  . The payoﬀ function Φ satisfies the strategic substitutes
property if Φ ( + 1 0)−Φ ( 0)  Φ ( + 1 )−Φ ( ).
The next lemma is a reproduction of Proposition 3.1 of Goyal and Joshi (2006).
Lemma 2 For a playing the field game, if the payoﬀ function satisfies convexity in
own links and the strategic substitutes property, then a pairwise equilibrium network
always exists. Furthermore, if the payoﬀ function satisfies convexity in own links, the
pairwise equilibrium network is either complete or empty or has the dominant group
architecture.
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In the appendix we show that the network games qualifies as playing the field
game. Furthermore, the payoﬀ function satisfies convexity in own links as well as the
strategic substitutes property. In fact, if we define
∆( ) = Φ ( + 1 )−Φ ( ) 
then we show in the appendix that
∆
 =
22 (114 + 443 − 62 − 100+ 83)
18 (1 + )2 (3 + )2  0
and ∆
 = −
42 (223 + 1022 + 66− 158)
18 (1 + )2 (3 + )2  0
Therefore, applying Lemma 2, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The pairwise equilibrium network exists and is either complete or empty
or has a dominant group architecture.
We note that in the one-market Cournot model, the dominant group architecture
emerges. To see this, one can verify that the one-market Cournot game is also an
example of playing the field game and then apply Lemma 2.
5 Configuration of Eﬃcient Networks
We shall distinguish between three kinds of eﬃciency. First the eﬃcient networks
for firms is one that maximizes the joint profits of firms. This corresponds to the
usual notion of eﬃciency as defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) because firms
are involved in the link formation process. However, one can define two other kinds
of eﬃciency. The eﬃcient networks for consumers are ones that maximize the overall
consumer surplus. Overall eﬃciency refers in our case to networks maximizing the
sum of joint profits and overall consumer surplus. If we just use the words, eﬃcient
networks, we are referring to eﬃcient networks for firms.
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5.1 Eﬃcient Networks for Firms
In this section, we shall discuss eﬃcient networks where the social welfare function
is defined by the sum of profits of all the firms. While we do not obtain an exact
characterization of eﬃcient networks, we can identify certain properties of such net-
works. Let Π : → R+ denote the joint profit of firms as a function of the network.
In other words,
Π() =
X
=1
()
Consider the eﬀect of link formation between two arbitrary firms  and  in a
network . In the Appendix we show that such link formation alters the joint profit
of all firms by
∆Π( ) = 0
"
( + )− 
0

ÃX
 6=

!
+ Λ0
#
− 2 (18)
where  0  0 0  0 and Λ0 are constants independent of network structure.  0 has
an upper bound less than 11 (at  = 2, its value is 10791) and is strictly decreasing
in . It has a lower bound of 2 and converges asymptotically to 2. It is important to
note that at  = 4,  0 = 35 For the discussion that follows, let us assume  > 3.
Lemma 3 (i) For any network  and player  such that   ∈  and ()  (),
∆Π( +  )  ∆Π( ).
(ii) If () = () but  > 4, ∆Π( +  )  ∆Π( ) as well.
Proof. (i) Starting from an arbitrary network  with   ∈  suppose two players 
and  form a link. This implies from (18), the increase in social welfare is proportional
to
∆Π( )
0 = 2·0+·[() + ()]−
 0

Ã
(− 2)0 + 
X
 6=
() +  · ()
!
+Λ0−2
³ 
0
´
Then, for forming yet another link say , the the increase in social welfare is pro-
portional to
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∆Π( +  )
0 = 2 · 0 +  · [() + () + 1]
−
0

Ã
(− 2)0 + 
X
 6=
() +  · (() + 1)
!
+ Λ0 − 2
³ 
0
´
=
∆Π( )
0 + 
∙µ
1− 
0

¶
+
µ
1 +
 0

¶
(()− ())
¸
=
∆Π( )
0 + 
∙
2 +
µ
1 +
 0

¶
(()− ()− 1)
¸
Now, if ()  (), it implies () > () + 1. Hence, ∆Π( +  )0 ∆Π( )
0 completing the proof.
(ii) Now,
∆Π( +  )
0 =
∆Π( )
0 + 
∙µ
1− 
0

¶¸

Since  0 = 35 for  = 4, 
0
  1. Furthermore, 
0 and hence
 0
 is strictly decreasing
in , therefore 
0
  1 for all  > 4. Hence, it follows that in all cases,
∆Π( +  )
0 
∆Π( )
0 
The following lemma plays a key role in the results that follow.
Lemma 4 For any eﬃcient network for firms , if  ∈  and  ∈ , then () >
(). If  > 4, ()  ().
Proof. Suppose there exists an eﬃcient network  and  ∈  and  ∈ . Then,
∆Π(−  ) > 0. Suppose, towards a contradiction, ()  (). This implies by
Lemma 3 that ∆Π( )  0 contradicting that  is eﬃcient. Hence, () 6 ().
Next let () = () and  > 4. Again, ∆Π( )  ∆Π( −  ) > 0 which
contradicts that  is eﬃcient. Therefore, ()  ()
The proposition below sets forth properties that characterize eﬃcient networks
for firms.
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Proposition 1 If  > 4: (i) The eﬃcient network for firms cannot consist of more
than one component.
(ii) The geodesic distance between any two connected players in an eﬃcient network
for firms is less than or equal to 2.
Proof. (i) Suppose 1 2 ∈ () where  is an eﬃcient network and  ∈ 1 and
 ∈ 2. Now,  is linked to  and not to  which implies using Lemma 4, ()  ().
But  is linked to  but not to  which implies ()  (). Hence, we arrive at a
contradiction.
(ii) Take two players  and  such that  and  belong to () where  ∈ ().
Hence, a path exists between  and . Suppose the shortest path is {12 23     −1}
where 1 =  and  =  and  > 4.  is linked to 2 but  is not linked to 3. Hence,
from Lemma 4, we get
2()  3() (19)
Now, 4 is linked to 3 but not linked to 2. Hence,
3()  2() (20)
But (20) contradicts (19).
5.2 Eﬃcient Networks for Consumers
In this section, we shall discuss eﬃcient networks with regard to consumers. Namely,
these are networks that maximize the consumer surplus. Consider the total consumer
surplus of agents in both markets. It is given by
 =X

( − ∗ ) ∗ +
X

( −  ∗ )∗
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where ∗ =  − ∗ and  ∗ =  −∗ denotes prices in both markets at equilibrium.
Let  = P
=1
 and  =
P
=1
. Hence,
 = X

( − ∗ ) ∗ +
X

( −  ∗ )∗
=
X

(∗) ∗ +
X

³
∗
´
∗
= (∗)2 +
³
∗
´2
=
∙
(+ 2)− 
3 + 4+ 2
¸2
+
∙
(+ 2) − 
3 + 4+ 2
¸2
=
(2 + 4+ 5)
³
2 + 2
´
− 4(+ 2)
(3 + 4+ 2)2 
We can express consumer surplus  as a function of the network. To this end, let
 :  → R+ denote the overall consumer surplus as a function of the network.
Now, suppose two players  and  form a link in a network  where initially  ∈ .
Then,  increases by 2 and hence,
∆( ) = (
2 + 4+ 5) (2) (2+ 2)− 4(+ 2) (2)
(3 + 4+ 2)2 − 2
Proposition 2 The eﬃcient network with regard to consumers is either complete or
empty.
Proof. Consider any two arbitrary links  and  where neither link belongs to the
network. Now,
∆( +  )−∆( ) = 8
2(2 + 4+ 5)
(3 + 4+ 2)2  0
Hence, if ∆( )  0, then ∆(+  )  0 as well. Hence, starting from any
arbitrary network, if forming one link increases consumer surplus, then forming all
subsequent links enhances welfare as well. Hence, we end up in the complete network.
If on the other hand, link formation costs are suﬃciently high, the empty network is
eﬃcient.
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5.3 Overall Eﬃciency
Overall eﬃcient networks have similar properties to that of networks for firms. Let
us define
 () = () +Π() (21)
for all  ∈ . Suppose two players  and  form a link in a network  where initially
 ∈ . Then, let
∆ ( ) = ∆( ) +∆Π( ) (22)
Lemma 5 (i) For any network  and player  such that   ∈  and ()  (),
∆ ( +  )  ∆ ( ).
(ii) If () = () but  > 4, ∆ ( +  )  ∆ ( ) as well.
Proof. (i) From Lemma 3, ∆Π( +  )  ∆Π( ). From Lemma 2, ∆( +
 )  ∆( ). Hence, applying (22), the result follows.
(ii) The result is similar to (i).
The result leads to Lemma 6 which is the analog of Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 For any overall eﬃcient network for firms , if  ∈  and  ∈ , then
() > (). If  > 4, ()  ().
The proof follows from Lemma 5 in an analogous manner to that of the proof
of Lemma 4 so we skip it to avoid repetition. Now, Lemma 6 directly leads to
Proposition 3 and the proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1, and so we skip
it to avoid repetition.
Proposition 3 If  > 4: (i) The overall eﬃcient network for firms cannot consist
of more than one component.
(ii) The geodesic distance between any two connected players in an overall eﬃcient
network for firms is less than or equal to 2.
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The networks defined above belong to a special category of networks called Nested
Split Graphs (NSG) for  ≥ 4. Belhaj, Bervoets, and Deroïan (2013, p.9) define a
NSG as a graph which satisfies the following condition: if  ∈  and () ≥ (),
then  ∈ . Clearly, this is equivalent to the condition in Lemma 6.
6 Some Examples
Next, for the purposes for illustration, let us consider some examples. By eﬃciency, we
are referring to the traditional notion, namely the eﬃciency of firms. Such examples
besides being interesting in themselves also help us verify the above theorems. They
can give us additional insights that are not included in the above proven theorems.5
Example 1 Let  = 3. Then there are eight possible networks, namely complete,
empty, {12}, {13}, {23}, {12 13}, {12 23}, {13 23}. Let  = 400 0 = 100  =
005  = 0. From our above lemmas the candidates for stability are complete, empty,
{12}, {13}, {23}, {12 13 23} while the candidates for eﬃciency include all networks.
The payoﬀs are summarized in the table below.
Network 1 2 3 Π
0 975694 975694 975694 2927083
{12} 975692 975692 975789 2927170
{13} 975692 975789 975692 2927170
{23} 975692 975692 975692 2927170
{12 13} 975690 975787 975787 2927260
{12 23} 975787 975690 975787 2927260
{13 23} 975787 975787 975690 2927260
 975785 975785 975785 2927360
The unique stable network is the empty network and the unique eﬃcient network is
the complete network.
5All computations were done in Wolfram Mathematica 6.0 and available upon request.
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This example confirms that the sets of stable and eﬃcient networks need not
coincide. Now, let us in Example 1 increase  from 005 to 5. The complete network
remains the eﬃcient network, but now the stable networks are given by {},   ∈
{1 2 3} and the complete network. We show this in Example 2.
Example 2 Let  = 3. Let  = 400 0 = 100  = 5  = 0. The payoﬀs are
summarized in the table below.
Network 1 2 3 Π
0 975694 975694 975694 2927083
{12} 975899 975899 985529 2937326
{13} 975899 985529 975899 2937326
{23} 985529 975899 975899 2937326
{12 13} 976975 984985 984985 2946944
{12 23} 984985 976975 984985 2946944
{13 23} 984985 984985 976975 2946944
 985313 985313 985313 2955938
Now, let us in Example 1 further increase  from 5 to 45. We find that the
unique eﬃcient network is the complete network and the unique stable network is
{},   ∈ {1 2 3}. We show this in Example 3 below.
Example 3 Let  = 3. Let  = 400 0 = 100  = 45. The payoﬀs are summarized
in the table below.
Network 1 2 3 Π
0 975694 975694 975694 2927083
{12} 1008924 1008924 1088924 3106771
{13} 1008924 1088924 1008924 3106771
{23} 1088924 1008924 1008924 3106771
{12 13} 1112778 1061528 1061528 3235833
{12 23} 1061528 1112778 1061528 3235833
{13 23} 1061528 1061528 1112778 3235833
 1104757 1104757 1104757 3314271
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The last example (Example 4) shows that the possibility exists that stable and
eﬃcient networks might coincide.
Example 4 Let  = 3. Let  = 50 0 = 100  = 40. The payoﬀs are summarized
in the table below.
Network 1 2 3 Π
0 70313 70313 70313 210938
{12} 167658 167658 45066 380382
{13} 167658 45066 167658 380382
{23} 45066 167658 167658 380382
{12 13} 320806 94510 94510 509826
{12 23} 94510 320806 94510 509826
{13 23} 94510 94510 320806 509826
 199757 199757 199757 599271
The unique stable and eﬃcient network is the complete network.
Now, let us focus on networks with four players. From the previous examples,
it should be abundantly clear that the network payoﬀ function satisfies a condition
known as anonymity, which means that the payoﬀ of a player in a network depends
on its position in the network rather than its identity. Hence, we shall use a generic
notation. The property also helps us reduce a total of 64 networks into 11. Let us
also look at consumer surplus depicted in the table below by  and overall welfare
depicted in the table below by  . We shall employ exactly the same parameters as
above.
Example 5 Let  = 4. Let  = 400 0 = 100  = 005  = 0. The payoﬀs are
summarized in the table below.
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Network     Π  
0 690204 690204 690204 690204 2760816 6961633 9722449
{} 690194 690194 690256 690256 2760900 6961560 9722460
{ } 690246 690184 690246 690308 2760984 6961490 9722470
{ } 690246 690246 690246 690246 2760984 6961490 9722470
{  } 690298 690236 690236 690298 2761068 6961420 9722470
{  } 690236 690236 690236 690360 2761068 6961420 9722470
{  } 690175 690298 690298 690298 2761068 6961420 9722470
{   } 690288 690288 690288 690288 2761152 6961350 9722500
{   } 690288 690227 690288 690350 2761152 6961350 9722500
{    } 690340 690278 690278 690340 2761240 6961270 9722510
 690330 690330 690330 690330 2761320 6961200 9722520
The empty network is stable and eﬃcient for consumers. The complete network is
eﬃcient for firms and overall eﬃcient.
In this particular case where link formation costs are low, the formation of a link
seem to unambiguously lower the profits of the two players forming the link and
increase the profits of the other players. Total profits however seem to be increasing
in the number of links. As a consequence, the unique stable network is empty and
the unique eﬃcient network is complete.
Now, let us look at consumer surplus and overall welfare. Consumer surplus is
monotonically decreasing in the number of links. As as result, the eﬃcient network
for consumers is actually the empty network. Inspite of that, the complete network
remains the overall eﬃcient network, because the gains for producers outweighs the
losses for consumers.
Let us now increase  from 005 to 5. The results are summarized below.
Example 6 Let  = 4. Let  = 400 0 = 100  = 5  = 0. The payoﬀs are
summarized in the table below.
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Network     Π  
0 690204 690204 690204 690204 2760816 6961633 9722449
{} 689803 689803 695624 695624 2760900 6954751 9725604
{ } 694509 690585 694509 701489 2781092 6948473 9729566
{ } 694509 694509 694509 694509 2778037 6948473 9726510
{  } 699661 694578 694578 699661 2761068 6942800 9731278
{  } 694578 694578 694578 707800 2791533 6942800 9734333
{  } 692550 699661 699661 699661 2761068 6942800 9734333
{   } 699016 699016 699016 699016 2796065 6937731 9733796
{   } 699016 695830 699016 705258 2761152 6937731 9736851
{    } 699555 699555 703900 703900 2806910 6933265 9740176
 703726 703726 703726 703726 2814902 6929404 9744306
The empty network is stable, but so is the partial circle {  }. The complete
network is overall eﬃcient and eﬃcient for firms. The empty network is eﬃcient for
consumers.
Finally, let us increase  from 5 to 45. The results are summarized below.
Example 7 Let  = 4. Let  = 400 0 = 100  = 45  = 0. The payoﬀs are
summarized in the table below.
Network     Π  
0 690204 690204 690204 690204 2760816 6961633 9722449
{} 729195 729195 755016 755016 2968422 6921445 9889867
{ } 736224 864045 736224 855902 3192394 6930188 10122580
{ } 736224 736224 736224 736224 2778037 6930188 9875082
{  } 779326 813290 813290 779326 3185231 6987861 10173090
{  } 813290 813290 813290 992861 3432731 6987861 10420590
{  } 1094754 779326 779326 779326 3432731 6987861 10420590
{   } 798608 798608 798608 798608 3194433 7094465 10288900
{   } 798608 986215 798608 858501 3441933 7094465 10536400
{    } 913750 913750 820000 820000 3476500 7250000 10717500
 877358 877358 877358 877358 3509433 7454465 10963900
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The stable network is {}, but so is the partial circle {  }. The complete
network is overall eﬃcient and eﬃcient for firms and consumers as well.
7 Conclusion
The dynamics of multi-market oligopolies first discussed in Bulow et. al. (1985) can
upset many results which would hold in isolated oligopoly markets. Here we take the
situation of collaborative link formation among Cournot oligopolists with zero link
formation costs. The results that a complete network materializes in equilibrium no
longer holds one we introduces participation of the same set of firms in another not
completely unrelated market. A variety of networks including the empty network can
materialize in equilibrium.
With positive link formation costs, stable networks have a dominant group archi-
tecture. Eﬃcient networks have the interesting feature that they consist of only one
non-empty component and in that component, the geodesic distance between any two
players is two or less. An exact characterization of eﬃcient networks in this example,
or more broadly, in playing the field games in general is an open question, and is
reserved as a future endeavour.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of the Multi-market equilibrium
First substituting (1)-(3) in (4), we get an expression for profits namely,
 =
Ã
 −  −
X
 6=

!
·  +
Ã
 − −
X
 6=

!
· − 1
2
( +)2 (23)
Diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to  and , we get the first order conditions:

 = 0;

 = 0.
These result in the following two equations:
 − 2 −
X
 6=
 −  − = 0; (24)
 − 2 −
X
 6=
 − −  = 0. (25)
Let  = P
=1
 and  =
P
=1
. Then, (24) and (25) can be rewritten as
 − 2 −  − = 0; (26)
 − 2 −−  = 0. (27)
Summing up (26) over all , we get
X
=1
 − 2 ·  −  ·  − = 0.
Summing up (27) over all , we get
X
=1
 − 2 ·−  ·−  = 0.
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Denoting  = P
=1
 and  =
P
=1
, the above two equations can be re-written as:
− (+ 2) − = 0; (28)
 − (+ 2)−  = 0 (29)
(28) and (29) constitute a simultaneous equation system of two equations in two
unknowns which can be solved to yield
∗ = (+ 2)− 
3 + 4+ 2 ; (30)
∗ = (+ 2) − 
3 + 4+ 2  (31)
Substituting (30) and (31) in (26) and (27), we again get a linear system of two
equations in two unknowns, namely,
 − 2 − (+ 2)− 
3 + 4+ 2 − = 0; (32)
 − 2 − (+ 2) − 3 + 4+ 2 −  = 0. (33)
Solving (32) and (33), we get
∗ = 13(3 + 4+ 2)
£
(6 + 8+ 22) − (3 + 4+ 2)
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4+ 2)
£−(5 + 2)+ (4 + )¤ ; (34)
∗ = 13(3 + 4+ 2)
£
(6 + 8+ 22) − (3 + 4+ 2)
¤
+
1
3(3 + 4+ 2)
£−(5 + 2) + (4 + )¤  (35)
Substituting (30), (31), (34), and (35) in (23), we get an expression for profits, namely,
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∗ =
h 2
18(1+)2(3+)2
i ¡
8 + 24+ 1072 + 663 + 114¢
+
h ·
18(1+)2(3+)2
i ¡
16 + 48− 1102 − 843 − 144¢
+
h 2
18(1+)2(3+)2
i ¡
8 + 24+ 1072 + 663 + 114¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
·


 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8− 182− 1242 − 223¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
·


 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8 + 142+ 922 + 143¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣


 6=

2
18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡
83 + 58+ 112¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
·


 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8 + 142+ 922 + 143¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
·


 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8− 182− 1242 − 223¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣


 6=

2
18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡
83 + 58+ 112¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣


 6=



 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−158− 100− 142¢ (36)
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Hence,
() =
h ()2
18(1+)2(3+)2
i ¡
8 + 24+ 1072 + 663 + 114¢
+
h ()·
18(1+)2(3+)2
i ¡
16 + 48− 1102 − 843 − 144¢
+
h 2
18(1+)2(3+)2
i ¡
8 + 24+ 1072 + 663 + 114¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
()·


 6=
()

18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8− 182− 1242 − 223¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
·


 6=
()

18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8 + 142+ 922 + 143¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣


 6=
()
2
18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡
83 + 58+ 112¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
()·


 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8 + 142+ 922 + 143¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣
·


 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−8− 182− 1242 − 223¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣


 6=

2
18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡
83 + 58+ 112¢
+
⎡
⎢⎣


 6=
()


 6=


18(1+)2(3+)2
⎤
⎥⎦
¡−158− 100− 142¢
− · () (37)
8.2 Pairwise Equilibrium Networks
First, we will show that the network game is playing the field game. There are
two arguments in the payoﬀ function. The first one is  () and the second one is
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X
 6=
 (). First,
 () = 0 +  ·  () .
Second, X
 6=
 () = (− 1) 0 + 
X
 6=
 () 
Consider the links of player  6=  in network  given by  (). One can divide this
set into two subsets. First, the links with player , given by say   () which is either
 or ∅. The second is the links with players other than , given by − (). Let the
respective cardinalities be given by  () and − (). Therefore,X
 6=
 () =
X
 6=
 () +
X
 6=
− ()
=  () + 2 ·  (−) 
Hence,
 () = Φ ( ()   (−))−  · ()
The rest of the derivation is an exercise in tedious algebra. Let us define a set of
positive parameters.
 = 18(1 + )2(3 + )2;
1 = (8 + 24+ 1072 + 663 + 114) ;
2 = (−16− 48+ 1102 + 843 + 144) ;
3 = (8 + 182+ 1242 + 223) ;
4 = (−8 + 142+ 922 + 143) ;
5 = (83 + 58+ 112) ;
6 = (158 + 100+ 142) 
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Then,
Φ ( ) = 1
£1 (0 +  · )2 − 2 ·  (0 +  · )¤
−1 [3 (0 +  · ) ((− 1) 0 +  ·  + 2 ·  · )] (38)
+
1
 [ · 4 ((− 1) 0 +  ·  + 2 ·  · )]
+
1

£5 ((− 1) 0 +  ·  + 2 ·  · )2¤
+
1

"
4
ÃX
 6=

!
(0 +  · )
#
−1
"
6
ÃX
 6=

!
((− 1) 0 +  ·  + 2 ·  · )
#
+
where  is a collection of term unrelated to  or  and hence can be treated as a
constant.
Therefore,
∆( ) = Φ ( + 1 )−Φ ( )
=
1

£1 ¡20 ·  + 2 (2 + 1)¢¤
−
µ
1

¶
 · 2 ·  +
µ
1

¶
 · 4 ·  +
µ
1

¶
 · 4
ÃX
 6=

!
+
1
 [5 ·  (2 (− 1) 0 +  (2 + 1) + 4 ·  · )]
−1
£3 ¡0 ·  · + 2 (2 + 2 + 1)¢¤
−1
"ÃX
 6=

!
6 · 
#

Hence,
∆
 =
µ
22

¶
(1 − 3 + 5)
=
µ
22

¶¡
114 + 443 − 62 − 100+ 83¢  0
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Finally,
∆
 = 2
µ2

¶
(25 − 3)
= −2
µ2

¶¡
223 + 1022 + 66− 158¢  0
8.3 Eﬃcient Networks for Firms
Consider the eﬀect of link formation between two arbitrary firms  and  on firm
 6=  . The change in profits is given by
∆∗ = −
∙  · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
443 + 2482 + 364+ 16¢
+
∙
ÃX
6=

!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
442 + 232+ 332¢
+
∙  · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
283 + 1842 + 284− 16¢
−
∙
ÃX
6=

!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
282 + 200+ 316¢
+
∙ 2
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
442 + 232+ 332¢ . (39)
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Further, from (7), the change in profits of  gross of link formation costs are given
by:
∆∗ =
∙  · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
224 + 1103 + 902 − 134+ 8¢
−
∙
ÃX
 6=

!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
223 + 1022 + 66− 158¢
−
∙  · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
144 + 703 + 182 − 190− 8¢
+
∙
ÃX
 6=

!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
143 + 782 + 42− 166¢
+
∙ 2
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
114 + 443 − 62 − 100+ 83¢  (40)
Hence,
∆Π( ) = ∆∗ +∆∗ +
X
 6=
∆∗ − 2
=
∙
( + ) · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
224 + 1323 + 1322 − 332− 498¢
−
∙
ÃX
 6=

!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
443 + 3522 + 860+ 696¢
_
∙
( + ) · 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
144 + 843 + 842 − 316− 474¢
+
∙
ÃX
 6=

!
· 
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
283 + 2242 + 652+ 600¢
+
∙ 2
18(1 + )2(3 + )2
¸ ¡
224 + 1323 + 1322 − 332− 498¢
−2 (41)
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Note that we can simplify (41) into
∆Π( ) = 0
"
( + )− 1
ÃX
 6=

!
(443 + 3522 + 860+ 696)¡
223 + 1322 + 132− 332− 498
¢ + Λ0#− 2
= 0
"
( + )− 
0

ÃX
 6=

!
+ Λ0
#
− 2 (42)
where  0  0 0  0 and Λ0 are constants independent of network structure.  0 has
an upper bound less than 11 (at  = 2, its value is 10791) and is strictly decreasing
in . It has a lower bound of 2 and converges asymptotically to 2. It is important to
note that at  = 4,  0 = 35
8.4 Conditions for the Empty Network to be an Equilibrium
Network with Zero Link Formation Costs
Let  be zero. Then, substituting  = 0 and  = 0 in (22), we get
∆(0 0) = 1
£1 ¡20 ·  + 2¢+ 5 ·  (2 (− 1) 0 + )− 3 ¡0 ·  · + 2¢¤
−
µ
1

¶
(2 − 4)
+
µ
1

¶

ÃX
 6=

!
(4 − 6)
Let 1  2  · · ·  . Then, if
2 
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 (20 + ) + 5 (2 (− 1) 0 + )− 3 (0 · + ) +
ÃP
 6=2

!
(4 − 6)
2 − 4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

then ∆(0 0)  0 and hence the empty network is an equilibrium network.
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